Intergenerational transfers and household structure: why do most Italian youths live with their parents? by Manacorda, Marco & Moretti, Enrico
Abstract 
 
85% of Italian men aged 18-33 live with their parents.  We argue that Italian parents like to 
live with their children and a rise in their income makes it possible for them to offer their 
children higher consumption in exchange for their presence at home.  Children prefer to live 
on their own but are willing to exchange some independence for extra consumption.  We 
formalize this intuition with a bargaining model between parents and children.  We test the 
predictions of the model by estimating the effect of parental income on the probability that 
children live with their parents.  The key econometric issue is the endogeneity of parental 
income.  In order to identify the causal effect of parental income on children’s living 
arrangements we use changes in parents’ retirement age induced by the 1992 reform of the 
Italian social security as an instrument for parental income.  By raising retirement age, this 
reform forced some fathers to remain in the labor market longer than the cohort immediately 
preceding them, therefore raising their income.  Our instrumental variable estimates indicate 
that a rise in parents' income significantly raises the children’s propensity to live at home:  a 
$500 increase in annual parental income results in a 3 to 3.5 percentage point rise in the 
proportion of children living with their parents.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Young Italian men are considerably more likely to live with their parents than are their 
European and American counterparts.  85% of Italian men aged 18-33 live with their parents.  
In contrast, only 35% of American men of the same age live with their parents (Table 1).  The 
percentage is only slightly higher for French, German and British men.  Even among the 
other Southern European countries, rates of cohabitation are still lower than they are in Italy.   
In this paper we analyze the economic determinants of the living arrangements of 
young Italian men.  Obvious explanations for the high fraction of cohabiting Italians are the 
high youth unemployment rate and housing costs.  While we do not rule out the importance 
of these two factors, we focus on an alternative, less obvious explanation.  We argue that a 
rise in parental income makes it possible for parents to offer their children higher 
consumption in exchange for their presence at home.  We formalize this intuition within the 
framework of a simple bargaining model between parents and children based on the 
assumption that cohabitation is a 'good' for parents and a 'bad' for children.  In support of this 
assumption, data from the World Values Survey show that Italian parents are systematically 
happier if their children live at home while the opposite happens in the US.  Our theoretical 
model predicts that among selfish parents, all else equal, an increase in parental income 
results in an increase in transfers to cohabiting children, thereby raising the probability that 
children live with their parents.   
We test this hypothesis using data from the individual records of the Bank of Italy 
Survey of Households' Income and Wealth (SHIW) for 1989 to 1998.  The key problem in 
estimating the effect of parental income on the children’s propensity to cohabit is the 
potential endogeneity of parental income.  Parental income is likely endogenous because of 
the endogeneity of parental labor supply (parents of unemployed children may decide to work 
more in order to support their cohabiting children) or altruistic behavior of children (if 
parents suffer negative income or health shocks, their children may invite their parents to live 
with them).  An additional problem arises because data on parental income are available only 
for cohabiting children.  As with most existing household data sets, our data lack information 
on parental income for non-cohabiting children.   
To address the problems of endogeneity and lack of parental income, we use a Two-
Sample instrumental variable strategy (Angrist and Krueger, 1992).  Under an exclusion 
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restriction, the two-sample IV generates a consistent estimate of the effect of parental income 
on children’s living arrangements.   
Specifically, our instrumental variable strategy is based on the increase in normal 
retirement age mandated by the 1992 reform of social security.  The change in the retirement 
law potentially forced some cohorts of parents to stay in the labor force longer than they 
would have stayed otherwise, thereby significantly increasing the disposable income of some 
cohorts but not others.  Since our data can provide information on the age of parents for both 
cohabiting and non-cohabiting children, we can analyze the effects of the reform on 
children’s living arrangements.  Because our instrument is based on a change in retirement 
eligibility, not on the actual retirement decision, it is arguably exogenous with respect to 
other determinants of living arrangements.  In support of this, we show that the instrument is 
orthogonal to many observable exogenous characteristics of parents and children.   
A feature of the reform is that retirement age increased over time (from 60 at the 
beginning of the period to 64 at the end).  This is useful because it allows to include 
unrestricted father age effects in the model.  Identification comes from the interaction of 
father age and year of the mandated changes. 
Instrumental variables estimates suggest that parents' income is an important 
determinant of their children's propensity to live at home.  A 1 million lira increase in annual 
parental income (approximately $500) raises the probability of cohabiting by 3 to 3.5 
percentage points.  The estimates are robust to controls for local labor and housing market 
conditions, standard socio-economic characteristics, such as parents’ education and children’s 
age and school enrolment.  Our findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that parents 
behave altruistically toward their children. 1 
This work differs in two main respects from the existing empirical literature.  First, 
previous research has focused on youth labor market conditions as important determinants of 
living arrangements while we focus on the role of parental transfers.2  For example, Card and 
Lemieux (2000) compare living arrangement decisions of American and Canadian youths.  
They find that poor labor market conditions in Canada explain why the fraction of youth 
living with their parents has increased in Canada relative to the US in recent years.  In this 
                                                                 
1 There is remarkably little literature on housing arrangements of young Italians.  One exception is Fogli (2000) 
who proposes an overlapping generation model to study the relationship between family ties and labor market 
rigidities.  Recently Bentolila et al.  (2001) propose an empirical test of Fogli’s model. 
2 A related stream of literature analyzes the effect of pension and welfare transfers on living arrangements.  
Costa (1997) and Mcgarry and Shoeni (2000) study the effect of pensions on living arrangement decisions of the 
elderly.  Recently Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2001) study the effect of the US welfare reforms of the 1990s on 
the living arrangements of children and women. 
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paper we examine the role of parental transfers in determining the living arrangements by 
considering housing arrangements as a consumption good for parents and children. 3 
Second, our identification strategy, while similar to some used previously, represents 
an improvement.  Bertrand, Miller and Mullainathan (2001) and Duflo (2000) have 
previously exploited a special feature of the Pension system (in South Africa) to identify the 
effect of grandparents’ income on grandchildren’s labor supply and well-being and ultimately 
to test for different models of household consumption.  A recent paper by Edmonds, 
Mammen and Miller (2001) uses the same feature of the South African pension system to 
evaluate the effect of government transfers on household composition.  The instrument in all 
these papers is based on the non- linearity in old-age pension eligibility that mandates that 
only men above 65 and women above 60 can receive pensions.  Unlike this previous work 
which relies on cross-sectional variation in the grandparents’ age for identification, we are 
able to exploit a change in the retirement age over the sample time period, allowing us to 
control for unrestricted age effects as well.   
Finally, by modeling children’s living arrangements as a consumption good, our 
research adds to the to the literature on household consumption and the debate on parents’ 
altruism dating back to Becker’s (1981) seminal analysis.  The existing evidence (Deaton, 
Ruiz-Castillo and Thomas, 1989; Thomas 1990 and Chiappori, Bourguignon, Browning and 
Lechene, 1994, inter alia) suggests that Becker’s unitarian model of household consumption 
is strongly rejected in the data.  Also, direct evidence on intra-vivos transfers from parents to 
children (Cox, 1990; Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff, 1997) lends little empirical support to 
the view that parents are altruistic.  Our work provides further evidence to challenge Becker’s 
view with respect to parental altruism, one of the assumptions behind his Rotten Kid theorem. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we present a stylized 
model of living arrangements.  In Section 3 we describe the data and present our empirical 
results.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                                 
3McElroy (1985) proposes a structural model of children’s living arrangements where parental income acts as a 
source of insurance for children happening to be in a bad state of the world.  Ruiz-Castillo and Martínez-
Granado (2002) use this model to study the living arrangements decisions of Spanish youths. 
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2.  A Simple Model of Living Arrangements  
 
In this Section we present a simple model of children’s housing arrangements and present 
some empirical evidence that supports the basic assumption behind the model.  The basic 
insight of the model is that, conditional on housing costs and children's earnings, a rise in 
parental income tends to increase the children's propensity to live at home. 
We use a bargaining model to describe household consumption decisions.  We 
assume that parents derive some utility from cohabiting with their children while the opposite 
is true for children.  Parents can transfer money to their children in order to provide an 
incentive for them to stay at home.  We call this transfer the 'bribe'.  Depending on their 
utility function and the value of their income, children might be willing to trade some of their 
independence for some extra consumption.  We begin by ignoring any altruistic motive.  
Later in the section we allow for parents' altruism towards their offspring and show that the 
results can be reversed if parents are sufficiently altruistic. 
Cohabitation in this game brings a surplus, the foregone children’s housing cost.  We 
assume that parents possess all the bargaining power so that they appropriate the whole 
surplus if they get their children to cooperate.  We solve the problem by backward induction.  
We assume that children decide their living arrangements conditional on the transfers they 
receive from their parents.  Parents then derive the optimal transfer by maximizing their own 
utility conditional on the children’s optimal reaction.   
One of the key assumptions of our model is that parents draw utility from their 
children’s presence at home, while children would rather live on their own. 4 Evidence 
suggests that this assumption may be reasonable for Italy, but not necessarily for other 
countries, particularly the US.  Table 2 shows the results of an OLS regression of a measure 
of parental happiness on a dummy variable indicating whether at least one child lives with the 
parents and a set of covariates.  Parents are defined as men aged 40 to 75 and women aged 37 
to 72 with children.  The coefficient on the cohabitation dummy is reported for the same set 
of countries as in Table 1.  Data are from the World Value Survey 1981-84, which includes 
the question:  “Taking all things together, would you say you are:  Not at all happy, Not very 
happy, Quite happy, Very happy”.  We classify the possible answers into equally spaced 
values between zero and one, with “Not at all Happy” being zero and “Very Happy” being 
                                                                 
4 As suggested by Cox (1990), parents might derive a utility both from services provided by children (care or 
housecleaning, for example) as well as “more subtle types of service that entails the behavioral constraints 
associated with attention to parents […], companionship and conforming to parents’ regulations”. 
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one.  In the first column of the table we report the results of a regression with basic controls 
including family income, parents’ gender, parents’ age and age squared plus country-specific 
dummies.  In the second column we have included additional controls, namely a full set of 
dummies for parents’ marital status (married, cohabiting, single, divorced or separated and  
widowed), dummies for their employment status (employed, unemployed, housewife, 
student, pensioner and other inactive) and a health status variable.  According to the estimates 
in column 1, parents in Italy and Spain seem to be significantly happier if their children live 
with them, while the opposite is true in the US.  When we introduce further controls in 
column 2, the coefficient becomes insignificant for Spain, but remains significant and 
positive for Italy.   
Evidence from the same survey also supports our assumption that Italian children, all 
things equal, are indifferent between living at home and living independently.  In Table 3 we 
present results from a separate regression where the dependent variable is children’s 
happiness.  The sample includes males age 18 to 33, consistent with the sample that we use in 
the empirical part of the paper.  The variable of interest here is a dummy variable for whether 
the child lives with his parents.  In all countries, including Italy, the effect of cohabitation is 
negative, although it tends to become statistically insignificant when all controls are included.   
Although our results are only suggestive, it appears that children are indifferent 
between living at home and living independently in all countries included in this analysis 
while parents’ tastes for cohabitation with children differ between Italy and the rest of the 
countries in our sample.   
 
2.1  No altruism 
 
We assume that children’s utility is a function of consumption and a term representing the 
disutility of living at home.  Their resources are a function of their income, the compensation 
they receive from their parents if living at home minus any housing cost they will have to 
incur if living on their own.  Assuming a Stone-Geary utility function, their problem can be 
written as:  
 
Max log(CK+k1H) - H log(a1)  s.t.  CK+R(1-H)=YK+b1H 
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where CK is children’s consumption; H is a dummy variable equal 1 if the child is living at 
home; YK children’s income and R their housing costs; b1 is the compensation for being at 
home, which either comes in the form of a provision of goods or cash transfers from parents 
to children; a1 is the children’s marginal disutility of living at home (a1>=1); and the term 
k1H accounts for the fact that the level of consumption depends on whether children live with 
their parents or not.  We have postulated that parents only make transfers to their children if 
they live at home, a hypothesis that we will remove later when we deal with the altruistic 
case.  We assume that housing costs are borne by children if they live away from home and 
by parents if children cohabit.  Children stay with their parents if the marginal utility of living 
with their parents is at least equal to the marginal disutility, a1 : 
 
 (1) H=1 if (YK+b1+k1)/(YK-R)>=a1 
 
Conditional on the bribe, b1, the propensity of children to live with their parents depends 
inversely on their income, YK, and directly on housing costs, R .  (See appendix for the 
proof.) 
Parents’ budget constraint requires parents' consumption not to exceed their income 
minus any bribe they pay to cohabiting children.  We assume that parents observe their 
children's preferences, income and housing costs and maximize 
 
Max log(CP+k2H)+H log(c1)  s.t.   CP=YP-b1H    
      s.t. H=1  if  k1>=(a1-1)YK -a1R -b1 
 
where CP is parents' consumption and YP is their income; k2 denotes scale economies which 
accrue to parents from living with their children; and c1>=1 is the parents’ marginal utility of 
living with their children.   
In equilibrium, parents set b1 to make children indifferent between living with them 
and living on their own.  Any surplus deriving from reaching an agreement (R+k1+k2) will 
then accrue to parents who have all the bargaining power.  In equilibrium: 
 
(2) H=1  if  k1+k2>=-(c1-1)/c1 YP +(a1-1)YK-a1R 
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and the optimal transfer is b1*=(a1-1)YK-a1R-k1.  (See appendix for the proof.)  From 
equation 2 it is clear that in equilibrium the propensity of children to live with their parents 
depends inversely on their income, YK, and directly on parents’ income, YP. 
 
2.2  Altruistic parents 
 
We have argued that as parents’ income increases, they are willing to give up more of their 
consumption in order to compensate those children who cooperate, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that their children live with them.  We now extend the model to allow for altruistic 
behavior of parents towards their children.  In this case parents transfer some resources to 
their children irrespective of their living arrangement, although there is an additional transfer 
if children decide to co-reside.  The children’s budget constraint is now a function of both the 
bribe and the altruistic transfer they receive from their parents: 
 
Max log(CK+k1H)-H log(a1)  s.t.  CK+R(1-H)=YK+b0+b1H 
 
where b0 is the amount of the altruistic transfer and we have assumed again Stone-Geary 
preferences.  The compensation children want to receive for living with their parents 
increases as b0 increases: 
 
 (3) H=1 if   (YK+b0+b1+k1)/(YK+b0-R)>=a1 
 
From the children’s point of view, the altruistic transfer operates as unearned income, so that 
the probability of living at home depends negatively on the altruistic transfer, b0.5 The more 
generous parents are, the higher is the amount children require in order to live at home.   
Parents care about their children’s welfare and maximize a linear combination of their 
own utility and the children’s utility: 
 
Max log(CP+k2H) +H log(c1)+ r[log(CK+k1H)-H log(a1)] 
s.t.   CP=YP-b0-b1H   
 s.t. H=1  if b1>=(a1-1)(YK+b0)-a1R-k1  
     s.t. b0>=0 
                                                                 
5 It is easy to see that (3) is the same as condition (1) where YK has been replaced by YK+b0. 
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where r is the degree of parents' altruism.  The condition b0>=0 restricts altruism to be one-
sided.6  
In order to derive the equilibrium of the game, we assume that parents set b0 so as to 
maximize their own utility, conditional on their children living away from home.  They will 
then set b1 exactly as before.  In equilibrium the optimal altruistic transfer is a linear 
combination of the difference between parents' income and children's income net of housing 
costs: 
 
(4) b0*=max[(rYP-YK+R)/(1+r), 0] 
 
If parents are sufficiently altruistic (b0*>=0), then  
 
(5) H=1 if k1+k2>=[-(c1-1)/c1+(a1-1)r]/(1+r) (YP+YK)-(r a1+1/c1)/(1+r)R 
 
and the optimal bribe is b1*=(a1-1)r/(1+r)(YP+YK)-(1+r a1)/(1+r)R -k1.  (See appendix for 
proofs of equations 4 and 5.)   
From equation 5 we conclude that if parents are sufficiently altruistic (b0*>=0), the 
main result of section 2.1 is reversed:  in equilibrium a rise in parents' income reduces the 
children’s propensity to live with them.  Children of richer parents are less likely to live at 
home even though their parents would draw some utility from their presence.  The reason for 
this result is that selfish children of altruistic parents only care for the differential paid to 
them if they live at home (equation 3).  Altruistic parents, however, cannot commit to pay a 
high enough differential to those children who decide to live at home.  Children know they 
will get what they need from their parents whether they are living with them or not.  For 
r<=(YK-R)/YP equation 5 rewrites as 3 and we are back to the case no altruism. 
 
                                                                 
6 In principle this model could account for two-sided altruism.  If b0 were set by children in the form of a 
transfer to their parents, the problem would be written identically with 1/r being the degree of children’s 
altruism.   
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3.  Empirical Evidence 
 
3.1 Data  
 
The goal of this paper is to test the hypothesis that intra-household transfers play an 
important role in determining the living arrangement decisions of Italian men.  We provide a 
test of our hypothesis by estimating the effect of parents’ income on children’s living 
arrangements.  The model in the previous section suggests that if parents derive some utility 
from living with their adult children and are mainly driven by self- interest, increases in 
parental income should increase the probability of children living with their parents.   
We use data from the individual records of the Bank of Italy Survey of Households' 
Income and Wealth (SHIW) for all the available years starting in 1989 (1989, 1991, 1993, 
1995 and 1998).  The survey collects detailed information on household composition, 
including socio-demographic characteristics of its members as well as a rich array of income 
and labor market information.  For each household head, the data also include the year of 
birth of the father and mother and whether they are still alive.7  This allows us to recover 
parental age for non-cohabiting children.  Data on parental age for cohabiting children can be 
easily recovered by taking the age of the head and his spouse.  We ignore living arrangement 
decisions of women because parental age, on which our instrument is built, is missing for 
individuals who are not heads of households while living on their own.  In most cases 
household heads are men. 
The top panel of Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for children.  We define 
“children” as all men aged 18-33 whose parents are both alive, whose father is aged between 
40 and 75 and whose mother is aged 37 to 72.8 We define as cohabiting children those 
children who live with their parents.  Overall there are 29,024 observations in the sample.9 
Roughly four out of five men aged 18 to 33 live with their parents.  About half of these young 
adults work, suggesting that rationing in the labor market alone cannot explain living 
arrangements.10  Average annual income is expressed in million lira at 1995 prices and is 
                                                                 
7 This information is only available starting in 1989 and this explains why we restrict our analysis to the 1989-
1998 period. 
8 These correspond to the bottom and top percentiles of the distribution of parents’ age for the children in the 
sample. 
9 Since there is no way to identify grandchildren, parents or grandparents of the head in out data, we ignore 
children living in three-generation households headed by one of the children's grandparents.  Similarly, we treat 
those children living with their parents or grandparents (or both) who are classified as heads as living on their 
own.  Finally we assume that if a child lives only with one parent, the other parent is not alive. 
10 Work is defined as at least one employment spell in the year. 
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defined net of taxes and social security contributions.  Virtually all the children’s income in 
our sample comes from labor earnings.  Housing costs, defined as annual rental costs, 
increase by more than 20% over the sample period (1989-1998).  The average age of the 
sample increases by over a year over this period, reflecting the gradual aging of the baby 
boom cohort of the 1960.11 Similarly, the proportion of those living at the North decreases, 
reflecting the pronounced fall in fertility in the northern industrialized regions.  No clear 
trend is detectable in the number of those enrolled in school.  At the bottom of the table we 
report the average age of the mothers and fathers of the children in the sample.   
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the parents.  We define as “parents” all 
individuals in couples where the man is aged 40 to 75 and the woman is aged 37 to 72.12 
Overall we have information on 18,533 parental households.  Total father’s income is more 
than twice children’s income.  An increasing share of father’s income comes from Social 
Security payments over this period, which include both contributed and non-contributed 
pensions.  This reflects a rise in the proportion of fathers who are retired from 34% to 38% 
over the 10 years.   
Approximately 20% of mothers receive some pensions while around 30% work.  The 
remaining 50% is either unemployed or not participating, while receiving no pension income.  
Maternal earnings (calculated over the whole population of mothers) are on average a third of 
those of their husbands, although this in part reflects the lower labor force participation of 
women.  Fathers are on average better educated than mothers (although one observes a fall in 
the proportion with at most primary education for both).  Average age as self-reported by 
parents is approximately one year lower than parents’ age as reported by children.  This is 
attributable to the fact that fertility among new cohorts of parents has fallen so that there are 
more children of older parents in the sample.  To account for this, we present both 
unweighted and weighted regressions, with the weights based on the age distribution of the 
parents of the children in the sample.  In this way we give more weight to older parents, 
reflecting the fact that their children are more numerous in the sample. 
                                                                 
11 In Italy the baby boom took place about 20 years after the US baby boom. 
12 These couples may or may not have children.  While we know whether they have cohabiting children, we 
have no information on whether they have non-cohabiting children. 
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3.2  Econometric model 
 
To test our hypothesis that increases in parental income raise the probability that children live 
with their parents, we assume that kºk1+k2 in equation 2 is uniformly distributed and estimate 
the following linear probability model:  
 
(6) Hit = b0 + b1YPit +Xit’b2+ uit  
 
where i denotes a generic child and t is time; H is a dummy equal one if child i lives with his 
parents at time t; YP is parental income; X is a set of controls; u is a random term that reflects 
measurement and labor market errors, as well as any systematic factor affecting children’s 
living arrangements on top of parental income.  As discussed below, we cannot rule out that 
the error term is correlated with the regressors in the model.  Notice that based on the 
theoretical model in section 2, the model also includes children’s income YK and housing 
costs R on the right hand side of the regression model.   
The coefficient of interest is b1.  As argued in the theoretical section, an increase in 
parents' income should increase the probability that children live at home if the parents are 
not altruistic:  b1>0.  If parents are altruistic this coefficient is negative:  b1<0. 
In estimating equation 6 we face two problems.  First, data on both parental income 
and children’s living arrangements (as well as their income and housing costs) are needed.  
Typically, however, household data do not contain information on parental income for those 
children who live on their own and our data are no exception.  While parental income for 
cohabiting children is observed in the SHIW, parental income of non-cohabiting children is 
not available.   
But even if parental income for non-cohabiting children was available, parental 
income would arguably be endogenous to housing arrangements, and OLS estimates of b1 
would be inconsistent.  One reason why parents' income may be endogenous to children's 
living arrangements is that parents may adjust their labor supply depending on their 
children’s living arrangements.  Given the high youth unemployment rate in Italy, it is not 
uncommon for parents to work more in order to support their unemployed children.   
Another reason for parents' income may be endogenous is that some children may 
decide to live with their parents if their parents suffer negative income shocks.  In general, 
any omitted factor affecting the probability that children live with their parents that is 
 12 
correlated with parental income is likely to lead to biased estimates of the effect of parental 
income on children’s living arrangements.   
We use a Two-Sample instrumental variable strategy to address both the problem of 
missing parental income for non-cohabiting children and the problem of endogeneity of 
parental income.  The ideal instrument is correlated with parental income but uncorrelated 
with all other factors that determine living arrangements (including children’s income, 
housing costs and children’s age).  Moreover, to address the fact that parental income is 
unobserved for non-cohabiting children, the instrument must be available for both cohabiting 
and non-cohabiting children.  With such an instrument, one can estimate b1 in two steps.  
First, estimate the first stage regression on the sample of parents: 
 
(7) YPit = g0 + g1 Zit + Xit’ g2 +eit 
 
where Z denotes the instrument.  Then, estimate the reduced form equation on the sample of 
children:  
 
(8) Hit = q0 + q? Zit + Xit’q2 + vit 
 
A consistent estimate of b1 is given by the two-sample IV estimator (Angrist and Krueger, 
1992): 
 
(9) est(b1IV) = est( q?OLS)/est(g1OLS) 
 
One limitation of our data is  that the children’s variables (such as children’s income 
YK, housing costs R, and children’s age) are available in the children sample, but not in the 
parents sample, and therefore we cannot include them in our empirical analysis.  Similarly, 
parental variables are available in the parents sample, but not in the children sample (with the 
exception of parents’ age), and therefore cannot be included in our models either.  This is a 
concern because children’s income, housing costs, children’s age and parental characteristics 
are likely to be important determinants of living arrangement decisions.  However, if the 
instrument is orthogonal to children’s income, housing costs, children’s age and parental 
characteristics other than age, our estimator in (9) is still consistent.  The assumption that the 
instrument is orthogonal to children’s income, housing costs, children’s age and parental 
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characteristics can be tested, since we observe children characteristics in the children sample, 
parental characteristics in the parental sample, and the instrument in both samples.  Below we 
show that such assumption holds true in the data.  This suggests that the instrumental variable 
estimates are not affected by the failure to control for child and parental characteristics.   
 
3.3  Using changes in social security eligibility to instrument for parental income  
 
We propose to use changes in social security eligibility and retirement age introduced in Italy 
in 1992 as an instrument for parental income.  Retirement typically reduces disposable 
income, since replacement ratios are generally below one.  We show that changes in the 
normal retirement age introduced by a 1992 reform of Social security had a significant effect 
on the disposable income of the fathers, and we use these changes as an instrument for 
parental income.  We argue that conditional on parental age, the reform is uncorrelated with 
other determinants of living arrangements.  An advantage of this instrument is that it is based 
on parental age, which is available for both cohabiting and non-cohabiting children.   
Italian workers can retire if they have accumulated enough years of social security 
contributions or when they reach a certain age, called “normal retirement age”.  Normal 
retirement age and the minimum number of years of social security contributions are set by 
law.  Before 1992, normal retirement age was 60 for most men. 13  In 1992 a major reform of 
the Social Security system gradually increased the normal retirement age from 60 in 1992 to 
65 in 2000.14 
The rise in normal retirement age effectively forced some individuals in the affected 
cohorts to remain in the labor force longer than they would have otherwise.  We use the 
change in retirement eligibility mandated by the reform as a source of variation in fathers’ 
income that is arguably exogenous to children's living arrangements.  Specifically, the 
instrument is a dummy equal to one if the father is older than normal retirement age for each 
year.  In particular, the instrument equals 1 for fathers older than 60 in 1989 and 1991, 62 in 
1993, 63 in 1995 and 64 in 1998.  (Data for 2000 are not available.)  Because replacement 
                                                                 
13 Normal retirement age and the minimum number of years of social security contributions are different for 
private and public workers.  Here we only consider the rules for private sector workers despite the fact that the 
1992 reform also affected normal retirement age of workers in the public sector.  The reason for this choice is 
that private sector workers are by far the largest group and we have no information on the sector of activity of 
the fathers for non-cohabiting children or retired fathers.  For a detailed account of the changes introduced by 
the 1992 social security reform see Brugiavini (1999); and Attanasio and Brugiavini, (2001).  We are grateful to 
Agar Brugiavini for having clarified some details of the Social security system in Italy. 
14 The reform also reduced the generosity of the pension system by changing the base for benefit calculations 
and increased the number of years of compulsory contributions. 
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ratios are less than one and retirement is associated with income loss, we expect the first-
stage coefficient on the instrument to be negative.15  For example, the effect of the reform can 
be estimated by comparing the average income of fathers who are older than 61 in 1993 (all 
of whom can retire) with the average income of fathers who are older than 61 in 1993 (some 
of whom cannot retire).  Consistent with our expectations, we find the average income of the 
former group to be lower than the average income of the latter group, suggesting that changes 
in retirement age mandated by the reform have a significant impact on parental income. 
Since our source of identification depends on changes in social security eligibility, not 
actual retirement decisions, this is arguably exogenous to children’s living arrangement 
decisions and it should be robust to the sources of potential endogeneity outlined in Section 
3.2 above. 
The fact that the new law mandated increases in the retirement age over time allows 
us to control for father’s age.  Since the age of the father is potentially an important 
determinant of children’s living arrangements, our model includes an unrestricted set of 
dummies for father’s age in the vector X, together with year dummies.  Identification of the 
instrumental variable estimates comes then from the interaction of father’s age and time, i.e. 
the changes over time in the retirement age mandated by the law.  Below, we show that the 
instrument is orthogonal to observed children and parents’ characteristics, lending credibility 
to our identification assumption.   
In a series of papers that use an identification strategy that is similar to ours Bertrand, 
Miller and Mullainathan (2001), Duflo (2000) and Edmonds, Mammen and Miller (2001) 
exploit a special feature of the South African Pension system as a source of exogenous 
variation in household income.  Their instrument is based on differences is pension 
entitlement across age (and gender) groups.  Since their data consist of a single cross section, 
their identification comes from a comparison of individuals of different ages.  In contrast, our 
approach, which depends on changes over time in the age for pension eligibility, allows us to 
control for age differences.16  
                                                                 
15 To the extent that working lowers utility, and that without the reform some individuals in the effect cohorts 
would have retired earlier, the reform presumably reduced the utility of the cohorts affected.   
16 A second difference with these papers is that while in the South Africa case old-age pension recipients 
experienced large income increases, in Italy retirees experience income losses. 
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3.4  Empirical results 
 
We first examine whether observable characteristics of parents and children are correlated 
with the instrument as an informal test of instrument exogeneity.  We then show how parental 
income changes as a result of changes in retirement age mandated by the 1992 reform 
(equation 7) and how living arrangements change as a result of changes in retirement age 
(equation 8).  We conclude by using the first stage and reduced form coefficients to obtain 
estimates of b1 (equation 9). 
In Table 6 we report coefficients from bivariate regressions of different children’s 
characteristics on the instrument.  Recall that the instrument is a dummy equal to one if the 
father is older than normal retirement age mandated by law for each year.  The estimates in 
Table 6 are based on the child sample.  Estimates presented in the first column come from a 
regression that controls for unrestricted additive year effects and father age effects (the vector 
X) only, while in column 2 we also include unrestricted mother age effects.   
The first row of Table 6 indicates that the instrument is negatively correlated with co-
residence.  This is a first indication that parental income may be a determinant of living 
arrangements, since the children of those who retire (and therefore experience an income 
loss) display a higher probability of leaving the parental home.  There is no statistically 
significant effect of the instrument on children’s school enrolment while there is a clear effect 
on employment, earnings and housing costs.  This should not come as a surprise since all 
these variables are likely to be endogenous to living arrangements.  For example, housing 
arrangements are likely to affect employment via their effect on the set of available job 
opportunities.   
To account for this potential endogeneity, we also report the correlation between the 
instrument and the average employment, earnings, school enrolment and housing costs 
calculated for each age and area.  These averages are calculated excluding the individual 
under analysis and therefore should be uncorrelated with the instrument for the instrument to 
be valid.17  The estimates in the last four columns confirm that the instrument is orthogonal to 
the area average of employment, earnings and housing costs.  The instrument is correlated 
with children’s age, but the coefficient becomes insignificant once we also control for 
mother’s age in column 2.  All other coefficients remain essentially unchanged when we 
                                                                 
17 Separate regressions of individual outcome variables on area averages (excluding the individual under 
analysis) lead to the following estimates (s.e. errors in brackets): .955 (.009), .938 (.009), .906 (.012), .710 
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condition on mother’s age.  In Table 7 we report the correlation between the instrument and 
parents’ characteristics.  As in Table 6, the first column allows for unrestricted father age and 
year effects while the second column also controls for mother’s age.  The regressions are 
based on the parent sample.  Estimates in rows 1 to 3 indicate that the reform affects the 
proportion of fathers retiring as well as their pensions.  In particular, the reform forces about 
7% of the fathers in the sample continue to work (row 1 and 2).  The average increase in 
pension income associated with the reform is more than 2 million lira per year (row 3).  Since 
earnings decline on average by almost 4 million lira (row 4), the effect of the instrument on 
total income is a loss of about 2 million lira per year (row 5).   
The next set of results suggests that the reform had no effect on maternal labor supply 
decisions (rows 6 and 7).  When looking at the effect of the instrument on household income 
(calculated excluding children), we find a negative coefficient (rows 13).  The last set of 
results (rows 14-16) tests whether the instrument is correlated with observable parental 
characteristics.  We find that the instrument is orthogonal to father’s education and mother’s 
education, while geographic location is marginally significant.  When we include mother age 
effects in column 2, the estimates do not change.   
Table 8 reports estimates of models similar to those in Table 7, only weighted 
according to the age distribution of the parents of the children in the sample.  Weighting has 
very little impact on the results, only the coefficients on household income become 
marginally more precisely estimated with the weights. 
From Tables 6, 7 and 8 we draw three main conclusions.  First, the instrument is not 
correlated with exogenous children’s and parent’s characteristics, lending some credibility to 
our exclusion restriction.  This allows us to use the reform to estimate consistently the effect 
of parental income on co-residence.  Second, the coefficient on the pension reform variable is 
negative and significant in the first stage regression of father and household income.  
Retirement is associated with 2.1-2.3 million liras income loss (row 5 and 13 in Tables 7 and 
8).  Third, the reduced form coefficient is significant, as the instrument has a significant 
negative effect on the probability of cohabitation.  Retirement of fathers induced by the 
reform is associated with a 7% decline in the propensity to cohabit (row 1 in Table 6).  Taken 
together, the last two conclusions suggest that parental income has a positive effect on the 
propensity of children to cohabit.  But before we turn to the 2-samples IV estimates of the 
                                                                 
(.014) respectively for employment, earnings, school enrolment and housing costs.  All regressions control for 
unrestricted father age and year dummies. 
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coefficient of interest, we further explore the robustness of our first stage and reduced form 
coefficients. 
Table 9 reports estimates from regressions of parental income on the instrument 
(equation 7) including different sets of controls in order to assess the strength of the 
instrument.  These regressions are based on the parent sample.  In columns 1 and 2 the 
dependent variable is father’s income, while in column 3 and 4 the dependent variable is 
household income.  We report both unweighted and weighted regression results.  The 
coefficients in the first two rows are from regressions in which we control only for father’s 
age, year dummies and mother age, and are the same as those found in Tables 7 and 8 (rows 5 
and 13).  Rows 3-7 present estimates of the coefficient on the instrument in regressions that 
include additional controls.  As we add more controls, the results are remarkably robust and 
show that retirement is associated to a fall in income of between approximately 2 to 3 million 
lira.  The introduction of additional controls does not significantly affect the point estimates, 
which is consistent with the results in Table 7 indicating that the instrument is uncorrelated 
with parental characteristics.  The addition of extra controls improves the precision of our 
estimates. 
In Table 10 we report additional estimates of a regression of a dummy for 
cohabitation on the instrumental variable (equation 8).  Estimates are based on the children 
sample as in Table 6.  The coefficient in the first row is taken from Table 6, row 1.  It 
suggests that the households affected by the reform experience a decline in the probability 
that children live with their parents of about 7 percentage points.  As before, the remaining 
models are intended to probe the robustness of the base case estimates to the inclusion of 
different controls.  The inclusion of different controls does not appreciably affect the point 
estimates, though it makes them slightly more precise. 
From Tables 9 and 10 we confirm that retirement, as induced by the reform, tends to 
lower parents’ income and reduces the propensity of children to live at home, and that this 
effect is fairly stable across specifications.  We now combine the estimates in rows 1 and 2 of 
Table 9 and 10 to obtain instrumental variable estimates of the effect of father’s income on 
the children’s propensity to cohabit.   
Table 11 reports the results of the Two-Sample IV regressions.18  All specifications 
control for additive year and father age effects.  Recall that because the controls in Table 9 
and 10 are available only in one of the two samples (children or parents), we cannot estimate 
                                                                 
18 For details on how to compute the standard errors, see Angrist and Kruger (1995). 
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models with additional controls.  However, since the instrument is uncorrelated with 
observable characteristics of parents and children (as evident in Tables 7 and 8), the TSIV 
estimates should still be consistent. 
We report results with and without controls for mother age, for the two definitions of 
parental income used in Table 10 and using weighted and unweighted data.  The IV estimates 
in Table 11 are obtained by dividing the reduced forms coefficients in Table 9 (rows 1 and 2) 
by the first stage coefficients in Table 10 (row 1).  For example, the coefficient in row 1 
column 1 of Table 11 (.033) is the ratio of the coefficient in the first row and first column of 
Table 9 (-.072) and the coefficient in the first row of Table 10 (-2.169).  The other 
coeffic ients are calculated similarly.  The point estimates of b1 are stable across models and 
generally significant.  A rise of one million lira in parents’ income is associated with a 3-3.5 
percentage point rise in the probability that children live at home.  The results are marginally 
more significant when data are weighted and when parents’ income is defined as father’s 
income.19  
This evidence suggests that a rise in parents' income tends to raise the probability that 
children live at home.  We cannot reject the hypothesis that Italian parents “bribe” their 
children to induce them to live with them longer.   
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
Among industrialized countries, Italy is an outlier in terms of the living arrangements of its 
young men.  Although labor and housing market conditions are clearly part of the explanation 
for the high rates of cohabitation, in this paper we argue that intra-household transfers play an 
important role in determining living arrangements.   
We hypothesize that parents and children bargain over the latter’s living 
arrangements.  Children are willing to give up some of their independence (a good for 
children) in exchange for financial transfers on the part of their parents while their parents are 
willing to give up some consumption in exchange for their children’s presence at home (a 
good for parents).  The implications of this model contrast starkly with that of an altruistic 
model, where parents care about child well-being.  While in the ‘exchange’ model children of 
                                                                 
19 An OLS regression of children’s living arrangements H on children’s income delivers a coefficient of -.010 
(s.e. .0001).  If children’s income is instrumented by the area average (excluding the individual under analysis) 
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richer parents are more likely to live with their parents, the opposite occurs when parents are 
altruistic.   
To obtain consistent estimates, we exploit a major reform of the social security that 
took place in Italy during the 1990s.  This reform raised normal retirement age for men, 
forcing some cohort of fathers to stay in work longer than the cohorts just preceding them.  
We use this discontinuous change in retirement rules to show that retirement is associated to 
a significant fall in father’s income, while children tend to move out as their fathers retire.  In 
order to carry our exercise, we use a Two-Sample IV estimator.  We show that a one million 
lira rise in parents' annual income (approximately 500 US$) increases the probability that 
children live with their parents by between 3 and 3.5 percentage points.  This lends strong 
support to the exchange model as opposed to the altruistic model.   
                                                                 
this delivers an IV coefficient of -.019 (s.e. .0003).  Both regressions control for unrestricted father age and year 
dummies.   
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Table 1 
Percentage of Children Living With Parents.  Males Aged 18-33. 
 
Country % 
France 43 
United-Kingdom 45 
Germany 43 
Italy 85 
Spain 62 
USA 35 
Portugal 71 
 
 
Notes.  For Italy, the source is SHIW 1998.  For other European countries is the European 
Panel, 1996; for the US is CPS monthly files 1996.   
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Table 2  
Parents’ Happiness When Living With Their Children 
 
  
 Basic controls  Additional controls 
      
France -1.089 (1.301)  -2.075 (1.286) 
Great Britain -1.490 (1.281)  -1.935 (1.257) 
West Germany -0.345 (1.222)  -1.754 (1.203) 
Italy 5.420 (1.590)  4.084 (1.566) 
Spain 3.123 (1.549)  1.892 (1.520) 
US -3.167 (1.527)  -2.706 (1.498) 
Portugal 1.805 (3.106)  1.287 (3.044) 
 
 
Notes.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The dependent variable is parents’ happiness.  
Happiness is a categorical variable which takes 4 values between 0 (not at all happy) and 1 
(very happy).  The coefficients reported are the estimated coefficients (*100) on a dummy 
variable equal to one if at least one child lives with the parents.  Basic controls include family 
income, parents’ gender, parents’ age and age squared plus country-specific dummies.  
Additional controls include a full set of dummies for parents’ marital status (married, 
cohabiting, single, divorced or separated and widowed), dummies for their employment status 
(employed, unemployed, housewife, student, pensioner and other inactive) and health status.  
The coefficients on these controls are constrained to be equal across countries.  Regressions 
are weighted by sampling weights.  Sample includes men aged 40-75 and women aged 37-72 
with children.  Number of observations:  6021.  Data:  World Values Survey, 1981-84.   
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Table 3 
Children Happiness When Living With Their Parents 
 
 Basic controls  Additional controls 
      
France 1.454 (2.195)  2.635 (2.319) 
Great Britain -5.031 (2.053)  -1.851 (2.188) 
West Germany -4.557 (2.086)  -2.953 (2.178) 
Italy -6.312 (2.139)  -3.278 (2.262) 
Spain -3.886 (2.322)  -0.688 (2.433) 
US -1.181 (2.616)  1.800 (2.699) 
Portugal -6.116 (4.348)  -2.830 (4.407) 
 
 
Notes.  See notes to Table 2.  Number of observations:  2247.   
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics:  Children 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998
Living with parents 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.85
Student 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.25
Working 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.51
Income 12.810 11.631 9.949 9.307 11.203
Rent 6.669 6.690 7.219 8.088 8.489
Age 23.88 24.32 24.40 24.54 25.14
Age father 55.19 56.07 55.90 55.96 56.29
Age mother 51.33 52.16 51.92 52.10 52.39
North 44.70 43.80 44.43 43.53 42.75
 
Sample size 6,145 6,036 5,728 5,868 5,247
    
Notes.  Sample:  males 18-33.  All money variables in 1995 million lira.  Source:  SHIW 
individual records. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics:  Parents 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998
Father retired 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.38
Father working 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.56 0.57
Father pensions 6.306 6.750 7.339 8.082 8.167
Father earnings 20.867 18.986 18.394 16.368 18.195
Father total income 27.173 25.736 25.733 24.450 26.362
   
Mother retired 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.17
Mother working 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.31
Mother pensions 2.099 2.246 2.414 2.561 2.473
Mother earnings 6.073 5.874 6.181 5.744 6.668
Mother total income 8.172 8.121 8.595 8.305 9.142
   
Household pensions 8.405 8.996 9.753 10.644 10.641
Household earnings 26.940 24.861 24.575 22.112 24.863
Household total income 35.345 33.856 34.328 32.756 35.504
   
Father education   
No education 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05
Primary 0.40 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.31
Lower secondary 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.34
Upper secondary 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.23
College 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Mother education   
No education 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.06
Primary 0.46 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.37
Lower secondary 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.31
Upper secondary 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.20
College 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
   
Father age 54.70 55.22 55.02 55.67 55.26
Mother age 51.06 51.60 51.36 51.97 51.53
North 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48
   
Sample size 3,983 4,031 3,561 3,650 3,308
 
Notes.  Sample:  men aged 40-75 and women 37-72 in couples.  Source:  SHIW individual 
records.  Total income:  sum of pension and labor earnings.  Household income excludes 
children income.  See also notes to Table 4. 
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Table 6 
Correlation Between Instrument and Children Variables 
 
 Coeff. p.  value coeff. p.  value 
1) Living with parents -0.072 0.00 -0.080 0.00 
2) Student -0.022 0.13 -0.022 0.12 
3) Working 0.056 0.00 0.054 0.00 
4) Earnings 1.720 0.03 1.818 0.02 
5) Rent 0.087 0.00 0.081 0.00 
6) Age -0.257 0.03 -0.129 0.25 
7) North -0.014 0.40 -0.014 0.42 
8) Mother age -0.627 0.00 - - 
9) Area employment -0.001 0.91 0.004 0.65 
10) Area earnings 0.122 0.62 0.248 0.30 
11) Area students -0.001 0.91 0.004 0.65 
12) Area rent 0.007 0.29 0.005 0.45 
     
Father age dummies yes  yes  
Mother age dummies no  yes  
 
Notes.  The table reports the estimated coefficient of a regression of each variable on the 
instrument and the associated p-value.  All regressions control for year dummies.  Area 
variables are calculated as regional means excluding the individual under observation.  
Number of observations 29,024. 
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Table 7 
Correlation Between Instrument and Parents Variables 
 
 coeff. p.  value coeff. p.  value 
1) Father retired 0.066 0.00 0.070 0.00 
2) Father working -0.068 0.00 -0.072 0.00 
3) Father pensions 2.241 0.01 2.262 0.00 
4) Father earnings -3.894 0.01 -4.422 0.00 
5) Father total income -2.169 0.02 -2.310 0.01 
     
6) Mother retired 0.005 0.77 0.021 0.19 
7) Mother working 0.005 0.81 -0.003 0.90 
8) Mother pensions -0.311 0.72 0.499 0.56 
9) Mother earnings 1.215 0.52 0.288 0.88 
10) Mother total income 0.464 0.65 0.621 0.55 
     
11) Household pensions 1.299 0.14 1.605 0.06 
12) Household earnings -3.576 0.03 -4.404 0.01 
13) Household total income -2.218 0.05 -2.301 0.04 
     
14) Father education > compulsory 0.087 0.07 0.079 0.10 
15) Mother education > compulsory  0.023 0.24 0.020 0.30 
16) North 0.043 0.08 .047 0.05 
     
Father age dummies yes  yes  
Mother age dummies no  yes  
 
Notes.  See notes to Table 6.  Household income is defined excludes any income of 
cohabiting children.  Number of observation 18,533. 
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Table 8 
Correlation Between Instrument and Parents Variables 
Reweighted Data 
 
 coeff. p.  value coeff. p.  value 
1) Father retired 0.080 0.00 0.085 0.00 
2) Father working -0.089 0.00 -0.094 0.00 
3) Father pensions 2.594 0.00 2.637 0.00 
4) Father earnings -4.340 0.00 -4.915 0.00 
5) Father total income -2.336 0.01 -2.473 0.00 
     
6) Mother retired 0.005 0.72 0.026 0.07 
7) Mother working 0.008 0.68 -0.002 0.94 
8) Mother pensions -0.250 0.76 0.745 0.34 
9) Mother earnings 1.282 0.46 0.277 0.87 
10) Mother total income 0.456 0.63 0.658 0.49 
     
11) Household pensions 1.657 0.05 1.657 0.05 
12) Household earnings -3.943 0.01 -3.943 0.01 
13) Household total income -2.390 0.02 -2.448 0.02 
     
14) Father education 0.094 0.03 0.086 0.05 
15) Mother education 0.024 0.18 0.022 0.22 
16) North 0.034 0.13 0.036 0.10 
     
Father age dummies yes  yes  
Mother age dummies no  yes  
 
Notes.  See notes to Table 7.  Observations are reweighted by the age distribution of the 
children’s parents.   
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Table 9 
The Effect of Pension Eligibility on Income 
Dependent Variable:  Father or Household Income 
Independent Variable:  IV 
 
 Controls Dependent variable 
  Father income Household income 
1. Base case -2.169 
(.909) 
-2.336 
(.863) 
-2.218 
(1.114) 
-2.390 
(1.057) 
2. Mother age  -2.310 
(.908) 
-2.473 
(.863) 
-2.301 
(1.113) 
-2.448 
(1.056) 
3. Parents’ education -3.033 
(.827) 
-3.304 
(.785) 
-3.874 
(.961) 
-4.203 
(.912) 
4. Area -2.123 
(.901) 
-2.258 
(.857) 
-2.160 
(1.098) 
-2.273 
(1.044) 
5. Mother income -2.168 
(.901) 
-2.339 
(.855) 
-2.212 
(.904) 
-2.407 
(.857) 
7. All controls -3.086 
(.827) 
-3.343 
(.785) 
-3.140 
(.831) 
-3.417 
(.787) 
      
Reweighted  no yes no yes 
 
Notes.  All specifications control for year dummies and unrestricted father age dummies.   
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Table 10 
The Effect of Pension Eligibility on Living Arrangements 
 Dependent Variable:  Living with Parents 
Independent Variable:  IV 
 
 Controls  
1.   Base Case -.072 
(.012) 
2. Mother age -.080 
(.012) 
3. Age  -.092 
(.010) 
4. Area Employment -.073 
(.011) 
5. Area earnings -.064 
(.011) 
6. Area rent -.071 
(.012) 
7. Area students -.083 
(.011) 
8. Area dummies -.072 
(.012) 
9. All controls -.093 
(.010) 
 
Notes.  All specifications control for year dummies and unrestricted father age dummies.   
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Table 11 
Two-Sample IV Estimates 
Dependent Variable:  Living with Parents 
Independent Variable:  Parents Income 
 
 Controls Definition of income 
  Father income Household 
income 
1. Father age  .033 
(.014) 
.031 
(.012) 
.033 
(.017) 
.030 
(.014) 
2. Father age and 
Mother age 
.035 
(.013) 
.032  
(.012) 
.035 
(.017) 
.033 
(.015) 
      
Reweighted  no yes no yes 
 
Notes.  All specifications control for year dummies. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of (1): 
 
H=1 if  
 
log(YK+b0+b1+k1)-log(a1) >= log(YK+b0-R) 
  
YK+b0+b1+k1>=a1(YK+b0-R) 
 
 
Proof of (2): 
 
Parents will chose H=1 if: 
 
log(YP-b1+k2)+log(c1)>=log(YP) 
 
c1YP-c1b1+c1k2 >=YP 
 
Suppose:  
 
b1=(a1-1)YK-a1R-k1 
 
so that children are indifferent between living at home and not living at home.  Then: 
 
c1YP- c1 (a1-1)YK+ c1a1R+ c1k1+ c1k2 >=YP 
 
c1k1+ c1k2 >=-( c1-1)YP+ c1 (a1-1)YK- c1a1R 
 
k1+k2 >=-( c1-1)/ c1 YP+(a1-1)YK-a1R 
 
 
Proof of (3): 
 
Same as (1) where YK replaced by YK+b0. 
 
 
Proof of (4): 
 
In order to derive b0, observe that parents will set it so to maximize their own utility when 
H=0, so, from the f.o.c.: 
1/(YP-b0)-r/(YK+b0-R)=0 
 
(YK+b0-R)-r (YP-b0)=0 
 
b0=(rYP+R-YK)/(1+r) 
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Proof of (5): 
 
Parents will choose H=1 if: 
 
log(YP-b0-b1+k2)+log(c1)+r[log(YK+b0+b1+k1)-log(a1)]>=log(YP-b0)+rlog(YK+b0-R) 
 
and in equilibrium:  
 
b1=(a1-1)(YK+b0)-a1R-k1=(a1-1) r/(1+r)(YP+YK)+ (a1-1)/(1+r)R -a1R-k1 
 
    =(a1-1)r/(1+r)(YP+YK)-(1+r a1)/(1+r)R -k1 
 
 
so that children are indifferent between living at home and not living at home.  So, the 
parents’ problem can be rewritten as:  
 
log(YP-b1-b0+k2)+log(c1)>=log(YP-b0) 
  
c1(YP-b0-b1+k2)>=(YP-b0) 
  
c1k2>=-(c1-1)(YP-b0)+c1b1 
 
c1k2>=-(c1-1)(YP+YK-R)/(1+r)+c1(a1-1)r/(1+r)(YP+YK)- c1(1+r a1)/(1+r)R -c1k1 
 
c1(k1+k2)>=[-(c1-1)+c1(a1-1)r]/(1+r) (YP+YK)-(c1r a1+1)/(1+r)R 
 
k1+k2>=[-(c1-1)/c1+(a1-1)r]/(1+r) (YP+YK)-(r a1+1/c1)/(1+r)R 
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